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Do venture capital firms benefit from international syndicates? 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the benefits of syndicating with foreign venture capital (VC) firms for 
domestic VC firms in emerging markets. We find that the VC firms that are domestic to their 
invested companies and previously syndicated with foreign partners invest proportionately 
more frequently in riskier ventures. After gaining syndication experience with foreign VC 
firms, a larger number of their portfolio companies successfully exited, thereby suggesting 
improved performance. We hypothesize that this outcome is due to the organizational 
learning effects. While the previous research has shown benefits for foreign VC firms, our 
results show that domestic VC firms also benefit from international syndication through 
improved investments. 
JEL classifications: L26, G2 
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Large and well-established North American and European venture capital (VC) firms are 
increasingly investing in cross-border deals (Aizenman & Kendall, 2012; Cumming, Knill, & 
Syvrud, 2016; Dai & Nahata, 2016), especially in Asia, due to growing investment 
opportunities in that region (Dai, Jo, & Kassicieh, 2012). In the last decade, many Asian 
countries have opened their economies to foreign VC investments by removing major 
obstacles and impediments (Cumming et al., 2016). These foreign VC firms not only bring 
capital but also provide knowledge platforms to the domestic VC firms located in these 
emerging VC markets through the syndication process. 
This paper investigates the knowledge gained by the VC firms in emerging markets when 
syndicating with foreign VC firms. We define foreign (domestic) VC firms as VC firms 
located outside of (in the same) the country in which the portfolio company is located. 
Collaborations between (domestic and foreign) VC firms are sustainable when the benefits 
are mutual. From a foreign VC firm perspective, the benefits when investing abroad under 
syndication arrangements largely stem from a combination of information asymmetry and the 
country's legal system, both of which require domestic knowledge and contacts (Dai et al., 
2012; Wang & Wang, 2012; Cumming et al., 2016; Mingo, Morales, & Dau, 2018). 
Little is known, however, about whether domestic VC firms also benefit from 
syndication with foreign VC firms by acquiring new knowledge, although such benefits are 
often assumed. To investigate this different perspective, we use the organizational learning 
theory (Inkpen, 1998, 2000; Lyles & Salk, 1996) with the aim of examining the tangible and 
intangible benefits obtained by domestic VC firms when syndicating with foreign partners. 
The VC industry is characterized by the need for specialized skills in selecting, assisting, and 
monitoring portfolio companies (Brander et al., 2002; Dai & Nahata, 2016). This tacit 
knowledge is particularly difficult to acquire and requires significant experience with and 
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exposure to other deals. Syndication is an important means through which this knowledge can 
be acquired, as syndication constitutes a unique way for VC firms to gain exposure to others’ 
views (or "socializing"; Nonaka, 1994) and to learn how "deals are done" directly from 
reference individuals of well-established, foreign VC firms. This practice, in turn, helps VC 
firms to better address the information asymmetry and agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Haugen & Senbet, 1981) that plague innovative startups (Brander et al., 2002; 
Cumming et al., 2016). The acquisition of such tacit knowledge comes with experience 
(Nonaka, 1994). Such learning opportunities arise frequently during the VC syndication 
process, as the different VC firms participate in board and shareholder meetings on a regular 
basis during the years when they are locked in the investment, thus enabling the acquisition 
of different types of procedural knowledge (skills). 
The question of organizational learning through cross-border investments has been 
investigated in prior studies, especially in other contexts, such as joint ventures (Fang & Zou, 
2010), cross-border acquisitions (Dikova, Sahib, & van Witteloostuijn, 2010), and 
internationalization (Casillas & Moreno-Menendez, 2014; Gao & Pan, 2010; Jonsson & Foss, 
2011). Like VC studies, these works mostly focus on the learning benefits to the foreign 
player, not the domestic player. Our focus on VC syndication offers a suitable setting because 
it occurs repeatedly, which enables the changes in behavior and performance to be measured 
over time. In this setting, the accumulation of specialized knowledge is also critical to good 
performance. 
Measuring knowledge acquisition is difficult in empirical research, as it is typically 
multidimensional and intangible (Lyles & Salk, 1996). One method is through its impact on 
performance, which is an indirect way of capturing the impact of knowledge acquisition on 
the ultimate outcome. Given the particular nature of the VC industry, investigating the 
performance of domestic VC firms in their follow-up investments (i.e., future investments in 
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which this knowledge can be used rather than investments in which the actual learning 
process takes place) would reasonably capture the learning benefits from past syndications 
with foreign VC firms. Domestic VC firms from an emerging market can learn from foreign, 
well-established VC firms in a way that informs the future selection of portfolio companies in 
similar or even different sectors. Other unobservable benefits to domestic VC firms include 
better contract design, knowledge of advising and nurturing entrepreneurs, and monitoring of 
portfolio companies. Therefore, we expect to see direct impacts on the selection and 
performance of future investments. 
To test these predictions, we examine the VC investments made for 3,309 portfolio 
companies between 1996 and 2009. Our sample includes companies based in 13 Asian 
countries. Each of these investments has at least one domestic VC firm as an investor. We 
impose this restriction to obtain a setting for testing our prediction based on learning. For 
each of these VC-backed companies, we identify the participating domestic VC firms and 
assess whether they had previously been involved in deal syndications with foreign VC firms. 
We then investigate whether the companies financed by domestic VC firms with international 
syndication experience differ in terms of their risk level and whether they are more likely to 
be successfully exited.1 In doing so, we can assess whether the learning process affects the 
investment selection and performance of domestic VC firms. 
Our empirical results show that domestic VC firms tend to invest more often in riskier 
portfolio companies after their syndication experience with foreign partners. These results 
derive from the following three distinct measures of risk: whether the domestic VC firm 
invested in the first round of financing, whether the first round of investment was an 
early-stage investment, and whether the portfolio company is active in a high-tech sector. 
Prior VC studies have used these measures to describe investment risk (e.g., Carpenter & 
                                                             
1 Following prior studies (e.g., Dai et al., 2012; Dai & Nahata, 2016), we deem exits through an initial public 
offering (IPO) or a trade sale as successful. 
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Petersen, 2002; Cumming et al., 2016; Dai et al., 2012). This finding regarding the switch 
from less risky to riskier investments can be attributed to the skills and expertise domestic 
VC firms acquire during syndications with foreign VC firms. To investigate whether the 
changes in the domestic VC firms' investment behavior are due to syndication with foreign 
VC partners and no other factors, we include a large set of control variables in our sample. 
We also include deals made by domestic VC firms that have not previously syndicated with 
foreign VC firms to ensure proper comparability.2  
In terms of performance, we find that the percentage of successful exits (either an initial 
public offering (IPO) or a trade sale) from the portfolio companies is higher for domestic VC 
firms with past international syndication experience than for domestic VC firms without such 
experience. This evidence is more pronounced when the domestic VC firms syndicate with 
North American or European VC firms than when they do so with Asian VC firms. These 
results are again robust to the inclusion of a sample of domestic VC firms without any foreign 
VC syndication experience. Moreover, we document that the results hold when considering 
only an IPO or only a trade sale as a successful exit. 
Overall, our results show that VC firms in emerging markets learn from their foreign VC 
partners and can capitalize on their acquired knowledge in subsequent investments. This 
learning experience provides VC firms with the expertise and confidence to invest in riskier 
industries in the future, such as high-tech sectors and early-stage ventures, and increases the 
likelihood of successful exits from the portfolio companies.  
This paper contributes to the growing literature on cross-border VC syndications by 
showing the knowledge domestic VC firms gain from syndicating with foreign VC firms. 
Other studies have instead focused on the benefits for foreign VC firms (Buchner, Espenlaub,  
Khurshed, & Mohamed, 2018; Cumming et al., 2016; Dai et al., 2012; Dai & Nahata, 2016; 
                                                             
2 All domestic VC firms included in our sample had at least some previous syndication experience with other 




Wang & Wang, 2012), disregarding the benefits that domestic VC firms could accrue. 
Similarly, studies on joint ventures and internationalization have highlighted the benefits 
gained by foreign firms through organizational learning when interacting with domestic firms 
or institutions (Casillas & Moreno-Menendez, 2014; Dikova et al., 2010; Erkelens, Van den 
Hooff, Huysman, & Vlaar, 2015; Tan & Meyer, 2011; an exception is the work by Fang and 
Zou, 2010, which examines the joint benefits domestic and foreign firms experience). Our 
study thus complements these studies by suggesting the presence of mutual benefits in 
syndications between domestic and foreign VC firms. Moreover, our empirical setting allows 
us to examine a different context, without formal organization, and where the different parties 
interact in a syndicate that operates for a limited period.  
BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
Literature on VC syndication and organizational learning  
VC syndication is an enduring characteristic of the VC industry (Dai & Nanda, 2016; 
Meuleman & Wright, 2011). In general, syndication allows VC firms to form interfirm 
alliances (Wright & Lockett, 2003). The literature on VC syndications documents that 
syndicates form to share risk (risk-sharing perspective) or to access valuable resources 
(resource-based perspective). The risk-sharing perspective (Lockett & Wright, 2001) argues 
that syndication helps mitigate information asymmetry and adverse selection problems. 
Additionally, agency problems generate well known costs that can be mitigated through 
active monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which requires improved skills, or through 
syndication. By contrast, the resource-based perspective suggests that syndication prompts 
the sharing of resources among the VC firms (Hopp & Rieder, 2011). 
 Other studies, such as Grant (1996), Hamel (1991), Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria (1998), 
and Kogut (1998), have documented that alliance formation is crucial for future VC 
syndications. Broadly speaking, firms form alliances to gain a platform for organizational 
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learning, which provides access to their partners’ knowledge. Through mutual 
interdependence, problem solving, and observation of alliance activities and outcomes, 
participating firms can learn from their partners (Inkpen, 1998). Inkpen (1998) finds that the 
formation of an alliance is an acknowledgment that one partner has useful knowledge that the 
other partner can use to enhance its own strategy and operations. This type of knowledge is 
valuable to the partner firm, even outside the specific terms of the alliance agreement, 
because it may be useful in future deals. Alliances between firms provide a better platform for 
organizational learning than do other contexts, thus resulting in risk reduction (Powell, 1987).  
Several empirical studies (Dodgson, 1993; Inkpen & Crossan, 1995; Lane & Lubatkin, 
1998) have addressed the importance of alliances in the learning process. More recently, 
various international business studies have acknowledged the importance of learning in 
international expansions and the acquisition of specific knowledge. Fang and Zou (2010) find 
that the stability of international joint ventures, dependent on both parties’ absorptive capacity, 
is greatest when both have a learning capacity. Casillas and Moreno-Menendez (2014) find 
that the international experience diversity promotes the quality of the learning process. Last, 
Dikova et al. (2010) conclude that institutional differences across countries affect the 
likelihood of cross-border acquisitions being successfully completed and the duration of deal 
making. These authors further show that organizational learning moderates institutional 
differences. Other studies related to learning and internationalization (e.g., Erkelens et al., 
2015; Gao & Pan, 2010; Jonsson & Foss, 2011) show that foreign players benefit by learning 
from domestically embedded knowledge, notably through the flexible replication of existing 
organizations by large multinational enterprises. 
From the perspective of domestic VC firms, forming partnerships with foreign VC firms 
allows them to access heterogeneous knowledge and skills and gives them opportunities to 
learn from their partners (Wright & Lockett, 2003). Learning opportunities are important for 
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the VC firms considered here because the VC industry in Asia is rather young, 
underdeveloped and subject to high information asymmetry (Dai et al., 2012). The number of 
domestic VC firms is small, and they often operate on a small scale and are unlikely to 
provide much value-added advice to their portfolio companies (Bruton, Fried, & Manigart, 
2005). Foreign VC firms, especially VC firms from North America and Europe, have gained 
relatively rich experience in their home countries, and their value-added is not restricted to 
capital but includes knowledge of portfolio selection and disinvestment decisions. By 
collaborating, the domestic VC firms can access the foreign VC firms’ rich experience and 
expertise and acquire better knowledge about how to advise and nurture entrepreneurial firms; 
these factors lead to successful exits from portfolio companies.  
Syndicate experience and investment selection 
As noted, domestic VC firms often learn from their foreign partners during collaboration and 
use the knowledge in their follow-up investments. For example, the investment selection and 
focus of domestic VC firms might change as a result of foreign syndicate exposure. Foreign, 
well-established VC firms are more experienced in investing in early-stage, high-tech 
ventures. According to Cumming and Dai (2010), 64.3% of VC investments in the United 
States between 1980 and 2009 were in the information technology (IT) sector, compared with 
18% in the medical sector and 18% in other sectors. By contrast, Dai et al. (2012) document 
that most of the VC investments in Asia between 1996 and 2006 were not made in 
technology-related sectors, and they were not early-stage investments. This finding suggests 
that Asian VC firms are attracted to nontechnology sectors or to ventures that are already 
showing potential rather than to early-stage investments. Together, this evidence indicates 
that Asian VC firms have limited experience in investing in high-tech industries and in 
selecting portfolio companies at the early stage of development. By working side-by-side 
with foreign VC firms that have extensive experience and knowledge of investing in 
9 
 
high-tech industries, domestic VC firms may be able to learn from their partners and acquire 
the necessary skills to deal with the information asymmetry. If so, the acquired knowledge 
will enable domestic VC firms to sharpen their investment selection skills and subsequently 
invest in all sectors and stages. These skills further help manage agency problems more 
efficiently (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Haugen & Senbet, 1981). Therefore, we hypothesize 
that the domestic VC firms that have gained experience through syndication with foreign VC 
firms are more likely to invest in high-tech and early-stage ventures in the future.  
Hypothesis 1: Domestic VC firms with past international syndication experience are 
more likely to invest in sectors or ventures with greater risk. 
Syndicate experience and investment performance 
Various studies have examined VC exits in different contexts (Elisabete, Cesaltina, & 
Mohamed, 2014; Giot & Schwienbacher, 2007), reporting that the characteristics of VC firms 
and investee companies influence the exit outcomes. In addition, VC syndication (Lerner, 
1994; Megginson & Weiss, 1991), geographic distance, and cultural disparity (Cumming & 
Dai, 2010) influence a VC firm’s exit from cross-border investments. Recent studies on Asian 
VC markets (Dai et al., 2012; Wang & Wang, 2012) find evidence that a joint venture or a 
partnership between foreign and domestic VC firms leads to better investment performance 
for the foreign VC firms. We propose that, if domestic VC firms gain knowledge by 
syndicating with foreign partners, their exit performance in subsequent deals should be better 
than the exit performance of domestic VC firms without international syndication experience. 
Thus, we postulate the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Domestic VC firms with past international syndication experience have a 
higher likelihood of a successful exit in their investments. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data and sample 
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We collected VC investment and exit data from the Asia Venture Capital Journal (AVCJ) 
database. The database provides adequate coverage of Asian deals. The AVCJ collects data by 
directly contacting, on a semiannual basis, more than 3,000 private equity or VC management 
firms located in the Asia-Pacific region. The company also conducts daily research on private 
equity and VC activities in the region by searching company websites, corporate 
announcements, press releases, and public news. Thus, the AVCJ database captures all types 
of deals without any size limitations. As such, the coverage of the AVCJ database in the 
Asia-Pacific region is better than that of many other databases, including VentureXpert.3 
To construct our sample, we begin with all available VC investments in the AVCJ 
database, which includes 11,748 VC investments made by both foreign and domestic VC 
firms from 1990 to 2013 in Asia. We then restrict the sample to investments that received 
initial (first-round) funding between 1996 and 2009 because the globalization of VC only 
began to gather pace in the mid-1990s (Iriyama, Li, & Madhavan, 2010). We then track the 
outcome of each investment until the end of 2012, thus allowing at least three years in which 
to observe an exit for an investment made in late 2009 (see Nahata, 2008). Given our interest 
in investigating the impact on domestic VC firms, we include in our final sample only 
portfolio companies that received funding (in either the first round or any later round) from at 
least one domestic VC firm. To be included in the final sample, we further require that the 
exit date, investment size, and country of origin of the different VC firms involved are 
available. This filtration leads to a final sample of 3,309 investments in portfolio companies 
from 1996 to 2009. Our final sample includes VC investments in China, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. These countries constitute the set of emerging countries for the 
determination of domestic VC firms. We define all the variables in Table 1 and discuss 
                                                             
3 Table A1 in the Appendix provides a comparison of data representativeness between the AVCJ and other 
databases, including VentureXpert. 
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several in more detail later in the paper.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the Asian VC market from 1990 to 2013 (i.e., 
the initial sample of 11,748 VC investments, not our final sample). Panel A shows the full 
sample of investments made in Asia, by country. In our sample, China and India attracted 
more than half the total capital invested in Asia. In terms of syndication (the last column in 
Panel A), the mean syndicate size ranges between three and five syndicate members, 
depending on the country. On average, across all countries, the syndicates held 4.16 members, 
which is similar in size to the US VC syndicates (see Espenlaub, Khurshed, & Mohamed, 
2015, for recent statistics). Panel B shows that syndication takes place in approximately 30% 
(3,544 of 11,748) of the cases in Asia, while the remaining 70% (8,204 of 11.748) are 
nonsyndicated investments. Only 34.1% (1,207 of 3,544) of cases involve at least one foreign 
VC firm, while the remaining 65.9% only involve domestic VC firms. The participation of 
foreign VC firms varies, however, across countries. Most notably, investments with foreign 
VC firms as syndicate partners are overrepresented in China and India relative to the full 
sample of investments. 
Panel C of Table 2 offers insights into the syndications formed between domestic and 
foreign VC firms, as well as a disaggregation into different types of foreign VC firms (Asian 
or Western VC firms). On average, 22.4% of investments that involve foreign syndicate 
partners are with Asian VC firms, and 77.6% are with Western VC firms. Overall, the results 
show that cross-border syndication within Asia is not as common as in Western countries, 
where more than half the investments are syndicated (Nahata, 2008). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Measure of investment success 
The dependent variable in our analysis of investment success (labeled successful exit) is a 
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dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the portfolio company (the venture) is exited by VC 
firms through an IPO or a trade sale by the end of 2012. We consider exits through IPOs or 
trade sales as successful because VC firms generate returns primarily by exiting through 
these two channels (Dai et al., 2012; Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007). Previous studies of VC 
firms have also used this measure of VC investment success (see Bottazzi, Da Rin, & 
Hellmann, 2008; Cumming & Dai, 2010; Dai et al., 2012; Dai & Nahata, 2016; Nahata, 2008; 
Zarutskie, 2010). Moreover, using real performance data, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) 
empirically show that using both exit routes as proxies for performance is better than using 
only the IPO route. For robustness, we also examine IPO and trade sale exits separately.  
Measures of international syndicate experience 
We are interested in measuring the impact of domestic VC firms’ syndication experience with 
foreign VC firms on the former firms’ subsequent investments. Following this objective, we 
construct three measures of experience that capture the extent to which domestic VC firms 
can learn from foreign VC firms.  
Broad experience 
Since our unit of observation is a portfolio company, we evaluate whether any of the 
participating domestic VC firms had international syndication experience at the time of the 
financing round. In the case of multiple domestic VC firms, we evaluate each firm separately. 
We use the initial sample of investments extracted from the database to obtain this 
information. For each deal in our final sample, the variable broad experience (I) is then a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if any of the domestic VC firms have participated in a 
syndicated deal with a foreign VC firm in the past, and 0 otherwise.4 
Asian experience 
This measure restricts the syndication experience with foreign VC firms to that with firms 
                                                             
4 This dummy variable constitutes our primary measure. For robustness purposes, we also construct a 
continuous measure based on the number of foreign syndication experiences. For details, see Table 1. 
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located in another Asian country. Thus, the variable Asian experience (I) is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if any of the domestic VC firms have syndicated in the past with a 
foreign Asian VC firm, and 0 otherwise. This measure is therefore more restrictive than the 
broad experience measure, since the latter considers any foreign syndication experience. By 
construction, broad experience (I) = 1 when Asian experience (I) = 1.  
Western experience 
We similarly construct a third dummy variable, Western experience (I), which takes the value 
of 1 if any of the domestic VC firms have syndicated in the past with a Western (either North 
American or European) VC firm, and 0 otherwise. This measure is again more restrictive than 
the broad experience measure, so broad experience (I) = 1 when Western experience (I) = 1. 
Control variables 
The investment selection and performance are influenced by the VC firm and portfolio 
company characteristics. We therefore include several variables to control for the type of VC 
firms involved in the deal and the characteristics of the portfolio company. VC syndication is 
important because it can reduce the level of uncertainty and increase value-added (Megginson 
& Weiss, 1991; Giot & Schwienbacher, 2007). Recent studies on the Asian and Chinese 
markets (Dai et al., 2012; Wang & Wang, 2012) highlight the importance of VC syndication 
for investment performance. Therefore, we include a dummy variable (labeled VC 
syndication) that takes the value of 1 if the deal involves more than one VC firm (either 
another domestic or a foreign VC firm), and 0 otherwise. We also control for VC portfolio 
size because previous studies (Cumming et al., 2006) have found that portfolio size is 
negatively related to the likelihood of a successful exit. When more than one VC firm is 
involved (either another domestic or a foreign VC firm), this measure is the average portfolio 
size of the participating VC firms. We also include VC-type dummies to indicate that different 
types of VC firms (whether independent or corporate) are involved. In the case of syndicated 
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deals, more than one dummy variable can be equal to 1. 
Next, we control for venture-related characteristics. We include dummy variables that 
indicate the stage of development at the time of investment. Specifically, we include 
early-stage, expansion-stage, and later-stage dummies in our analysis. Previous studies 
suggest that early-stage ventures are riskier than those at other stages and have a higher 
failure risk (Cochrane, 2005). The levels of information asymmetry and uncertainty are also 
higher for early-stage than for later-stage investments (Dai et al., 2012). In addition, we 
account for venture industry-specific fixed effects by including industry dummies in all our 
estimations. We include time-varying variables related to the country of the portfolio 
company to capture the possible macroeconomic effects of selection and investment 
performance. Stock market development measures the level of stock market development in 
the country of a portfolio company; we measure it as the stock market capitalization scaled 
by the gross domestic product. Previous studies (e.g., Black & Gilson, 1998) have shown that 
a well-developed market is extremely important to the development of the VC industry 
because it provides a viable exit mechanism for both investors and entrepreneurs. Stock 
market development is also undoubtedly important in the context of cross-border investments 
because VC firms are more likely to exit successfully the higher the level of stock market 
development (Jeng & Wells, 2000). The additional country-level variables used for various 
robustness checks include measures related to the quality of the legal environment and 
cultural differences between domestic and foreign VC firms. Finally, the other control 
variables include the total rounds received, to control for actual investment size; portfolio 
company country dummies, to control for unobservable country fixed effects; and investment 
year dummies, to control for unobservable temporal fixed effects.  
ANALYSIS 
Domestic VC firms’ international syndicate experience 
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We now examine, in a univariate setting, the impact on investments by domestic VC firms by 
studying the changes in their investment behaviors (i.e., type of portfolio companies selected) 
and exit performance (i.e., propensity to exit successfully) before and after they gained 
international syndication experience. If domestic VC firms do learn from their foreign 
partners during syndication, we should find a significant change in both dimensions. The 
results are shown in Table 3. We define the year 0 as the year in which the domestic VC firms 
began syndicating with foreign VC firms. We then count the proportion of investments in the 
early stage, the first round of financing, high-tech industries, and successful exits (IPOs and 
trade sales combined) for each year. For example, if a domestic VC firm has invested in 2 
deals in the early stage, 9 in expansion, and 11 in the later stage, we compute the proportion 
of early-stage investments as 2/22 (i.e., 0.091). We also calculate changes (“difference”) in 
these values over different windows (i.e., –1 to +1, –3 to +3, and –5 to +5). The first three 
dimensions (early stage, first round, and high-tech) measure the investment risk, as ventures 
in the early stage of development (vs. expansion or later stage), in their first round (vs. 
follow-up rounds), and active in the high-tech sector tend to be the riskiest investments for 
VC. Carpenter and Petersen (2002) show that high-tech investments are generally skewed, 
riskier, and difficult to evaluate. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows that domestic VC firms tend to invest more in early-stage 
ventures after they have acquired broad syndicate experience. Specifically, domestic VC 
firms with broad experience allocate 3.0–3.5% more of their investments annually to 
early-stage ventures. This change is primarily attributable to firms that have acquired 
international syndicate experience with Western VC firms, given that we only observe a 
statistically meaningful change in the case of Western experience (from 4.7% to 5.7%). Panel 
B shows the changes in the domestic VC firms’ investments in first-round deals. Firms with 
broad experience tend to increase their investments in first-round deals by 2.7–8.0% across 
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the different windows. Again, this change in investment behavior is driven by domestic VC 
firms with Western experience, where the changes range from 5.9% to 12.3% annually. Panel 
C provides a similar picture for the changes in high-tech investments. In terms of economic 
magnitude, domestic VC firms tend to increase their investments in high-tech ventures by 
7.9–11.4% after gaining foreign syndication experience. Although high-tech sectors might not 
be a good indication of investment risk, Roure and Keeley (1990) document that the risks and 
returns of high-tech sectors are higher than those for other sectors. Finally, Panel D shows 
that domestic VC firms with broad experience more often successfully exit their investments, 
as the percentages of successful exits increase by 0.8–8.5%. These results are consistent, 
regardless of the type of international syndication experience (Asian or Western).  
Overall, the results in Table 3 show that the domestic VC firms tend to change their 
investment behavior after gaining syndication experience by increasing their risk exposure. 
This effect is mainly driven by international syndication experience with Western VC firms. 
Consistent with our predictions, these results indicate that there are benefits and positive 
learning effects for domestic VC firms, especially when they syndicate with Western VC 
firms. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Investment selection 
We now analyze the investment decisions of domestic VC firms at the portfolio company 
level. We examine our cross-sectional data set in which the unit of analysis is at the portfolio 
company level (i.e., one observation for each portfolio company). We use the logit 
regressions in Table 4 to examine the impact of domestic VC firms’ international syndication 
experience (broad, Asian, or Western) on the likelihood of the domestic firms subsequently 
investing in "riskier" portfolio companies. To assess the riskiness of portfolio companies, we 
use three distinct measures, presented in Table 3 as follows: (1) whether the portfolio 
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company is an early-stage venture (the variable early-stage venture, our risk measure I) 
versus an expansion- or later-stage venture (Models 1–3), (2) whether it is a first-round 
investment for the portfolio company (first-round investment, our risk measure II) (Models 
4–6), and (3) whether it is a venture in the high-tech sector (high-tech, our risk measure III) 
(Models 7–9). All three measures of past international syndicate experience (broad, Asian, 
and Western) have a positive impact on the likelihood of investing in early-stage rounds, 
participating in first-round investments, and investing in portfolio companies in high-tech 
sectors. Thus, domestic VC firms with past international syndicate experience invest in 
riskier deals in the future. These findings are economically meaningful. For example, broad 
experience increases the likelihood of investing in early-stage ventures by 8.7%, Asian 
experience increases the likelihood by 12.7%, and Western experience increases the 
likelihood by 23.2%. We obtain similar results with our second measure of risk (Models 4–6), 
with probability increases of 7.1%, 9.0%, and 18.9%, respectively. The approximately similar 
values across our different risk measures are consistent with the general observation that 
first-round investments are typically early-stage investments.  
We find a systematically greater impact from Western experience than Asian experience, 
suggesting that domestic VC firms learn more from past syndication experiences with 
Western VC firms. Similarly, the results in Models 7–9 show that the likelihood of domestic 
VC firms investing in the high-tech sector is significantly higher for firms with Western 
experience than for firms with Asian experience. Thus, the learning effect is stronger for 
domestic VC firms when they accumulate experience through syndication with Western 
rather than Asian VC firms. The results from Table 4 provide support for Hypothesis 1, i.e., 
that domestic VC firms syndicating with foreign VC firms are more likely to invest in risky 
deals.  




We now examine the impact of international syndication experience on investment 
performance as measured by exits through IPOs or trade sales. The dependent variable is the 
dummy variable successful exit that takes the value of 1 if the portfolio company ultimately 
went public or was acquired by the end of 2012. The independent variables include the 
characteristics of the first round of financing. These variables are critical for VC firms, since 
they lay the foundation for subsequent investments (De Clercq, Fried, Lehtonen, & Sapienza, 
2006; Fitza, Matusik, & Mosakowski, 2009). 
Table 5 reports the results. In Models 1–3, we use the indicator variables used so far. In 
Models 4–6, we use the number of prior syndicated investments with foreign VC firms 
(broad, Asian, and Western) to offer additional insights into the learning process. The results 
of Models 1–3 show that domestic VC firms benefit from syndication experience with 
foreign VC firms. The likelihood of successful exits through IPOs and trade sales increases 
by 10.4% to 11.8% (depending on the specification considered), which is economically 
meaningful.  
In Models 4–6, we find similar effects. However, the coefficients are only statistically 
significant at the 10% level, which is generally not strong enough to support coefficient tests 
for hypothesis testing. Thus, we conclude that, while international syndication experience 
matters, it is mainly a binary impact. That is, after the accumulation of some experience, extra 
experience does not materially affect the learning process. Overall, the results suggest that 
partnerships with foreign VC firms assist in professionalizing domestic VC firms; syndication 
can serve as a useful means of acquiring this knowledge. Domestic VC firms learn from 
foreign VC firms and acquire better knowledge for advising and nurturing entrepreneurs in 
future deals, leading to successful exits, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
 The other control variables are also significant. VC syndication in the current deal 
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improves the success rate of the investment project5, while the VC portfolio size is negatively 
related to the likelihood of successful exits. We find that the participation of corporate VC 
firms leads to better performance than the participation of independent VC firms. As expected, 
early- and expansion-stage investments are less likely than later-stage investments to be 
successfully exited. We also find that the total amount of financing received (total rounds 
invested) is positively related to the investment performance. In addition, we find that greater 
stock market development in the country where a portfolio company is located improves the 
likelihood of successful exits, suggesting that having a viable exit mechanism, such as an IPO, 
is important for both investors and entrepreneurs (consistent with the findings of Black & 
Gilson, 1998, for the United States). 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Impact of the legal system and cultural distance  
So far, the results regarding investment selection (Table 4) and performance (Table 5) ignore 
the impacts of differences in legal systems and cultural differences. It is possible that the 
legal system in the country where the venture is located and cultural differences between 
domestic and foreign VC firms drive the likelihood of investment in risky deals and the 
ultimate performance. For example, Cumming et al. (2006) find that a more efficient legal 
system mitigates agency problems and transaction costs and, thus, facilitates VC exits, 
especially through IPOs. This observation is important, given the extensive literature in the 
finance field on agency problems that could explain risk-shifting incentives (see, for instance, 
Barnea et al., 1985, Jensen & Meckling, 1976, Haugen & Senbet, 1981). Similarly, Dai and 
Nahata (2016) show that cultural disparity reduces the syndicate size but helps improve the 
                                                             
5 In an untabulated analysis, we evaluated whether the type of current VC syndication matters. In particular, VC 
syndication may involve foreign partners, which may then affect the performance in the same way as prior 
learning. Therefore, we divided the variable VC syndication into the following two separate variables: one 
variable for VC syndication with domestic VC firms and one variable for VC syndication with foreign VC 
firms. The two coefficients obtained were not statistically significantly different from each other. We thus 
conclude that the type of VC syndication in the current deal does not matter. 
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chances of a successful exit. 
To determine whether our results remain robust to controlling for these alternative factors, 
we include the same measures in our specifications. For the quality of the legal system, we 
use the widely used index of “legality,” consistent with Cumming et al. (2006). Following 
Dai and Nahata (2016), we quantify the cultural differences between the portfolio company 
and the VC firms using the four cultural dimensions of Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 
(2010), who follow the approach of Kogut and Singh (1988). We obtain the data from Geert 
Hofstede’s website (www.geerthofstede.nl) and use the Cartesian distance measure to 
calculate the cultural disparity. For cultural disparity, we compute the cultural distance 
between domestic and foreign VC firms and the portfolio company, following Dai and 
Nahata (2016).  
Table 6 replicates Table 4 while adding the two extra variables (legality and cultural 
distance). The results show that cultural distance has no impact on the likelihood of risk 
taking. However, a better legal environment positively affects the likelihood of investing in 
risky deals. This evidence is consistent across the different risk measures. At the same time, 
the inclusion of the two additional variables does not affect our conclusions regarding foreign 
syndicate experience from Table 4, which supports the robustness of our results thus far. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]  
Some studies (e.g., Cumming et al., 2006, and Dai & Nahata, 2016) have also shown the 
importance of the legal environment and cultural differences for successful VC exits. These 
findings call for including these two measures in our exit performance analysis as well. 
Moreover, the performance may be driven by the investment objectives of the fund. We, 
therefore, calculate a third variable, denoted small early-stage fund, which captures whether 
the considered fund (1) belongs to the bottom 25th percentile of funds (in terms of fund size) 
in the industry and (2) is an early-stage investment. These investments are the riskiest. Thus, 
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we replicate in Table 7 the same specification as in Table 5 while including these three factors 
as extra control variables. Again, our findings on the impact of domestic VC firms’ 
international syndication experience on exit performance remain robust even when 
controlling for the quality of the legal environment, cultural distance, and risk at a portfolio 
level. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
Finally, our measure of success included both IPO and trade sale exits. From the 
perspective of VC firms, an exit through an IPO is often considered more successful than an 
exit through a trade sale. Lerner (1994) documents that VC firms only take the most 
successful portfolio companies public, for reasons of reputation. In contrast, for exiting less 
successful companies, VC firms may use a trade sale. To examine the variations between IPO 
and trade sale exits, we separate our measure of successful exits into IPOs and trade sales, 
respectively. The results are reported in the Online Appendix. Compared with the baseline 
specifications in Table 5, the results are similar, but statistically less significant, when divided 
by exit route. As Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) suggest, using both exit routes as a proxy 
for performance is better than using only IPO exits. Here, we obtain almost similar results in 
economic magnitude but lower results in terms of statistical significance when considering 
each exit route separately.  
Endogeneity 
Syndication 
Endogeneity might be an issue for VC syndication in current deals. We find that syndication 
in previous deals increases the probability of successful exits for future deals. Dai and Nahata 
(2016) point out the possibility of VC syndication being influenced by other factors that are 
not exogenous to the probability of a successful exit. Indeed, it is highly likely that VC firms 
might be tempted to join an investment that is showing signs of good performance, in later 
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rounds. This action could potentially induce endogeneity problems. To address the 
endogeneity concerns for the variable VC syndication in the performance analysis, we use the 
instrumental probit model. In the first stage, we estimate the syndication variable as a 
function of various control variables, including our instrument. We use the number of VC 
firms in the syndicate as our instrumented variable. We construct an instrumental variable for 
the syndication that reflects the investment concentration within a VC firm’s portfolio. 
Previous studies (Brander, Amit, & Antweiler 2002; Lockett & Wright 2001) have suggested 
that diversification is one of the motives for VC firms’ syndication. A VC firm with a higher 
exposure to a specific industry would have a higher incentive to syndicate with other VC 
firms and achieve diversification. Following the syndication literature, we construct 
(similarly to Tian, 2012) an investment concentration index for each VC firm in each year 
based on AVCJ industry classification. The index measures by how much a VC firm’s 
portfolio deviates in industry composition from a market portfolio consisting of all portfolio 
companies in which a VC firm could have invested. The index is equal to zero if the VC 
firm’s portfolio has the same industry composition as the market portfolio, i.e., the same 
proportion of firms from each industry as the market portfolio and increases as the VC firm’s 
portfolio becomes more concentrated in a few industries. The index is computed as follows: 
suppose that in year t, VC firm j has wi,t,j portfolio firms in industry i (scaled by the total 
number of portfolio firms in year t) and there is a total of W i,t portfolio firms in industry i 
(also scaled by the total number of portfolio firms in year t). The investment concentration 
index of VC firm j in each year is defined as the sum of the squared deviations of wi,t,j from 








Ww ,,,Index ionConcentrat Investment . 
Our choice of investment concentration index is motivated by the fact that the index reflects 
the decision to invest in the portfolio company. The question of whether to syndicate or not is 
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made almost exclusively by the VC firms and not the portfolio company. Hence, the index is 
likely to influence the decision to syndicate and not directly influence the subsequent 
performance, which satisfies the exclusion criteria. Moreover, we rely on the work by Tian 
(2012), who find empirical support for this variable as a valid instrument. 
In our second stage, we use the instrumented VC syndication measure in our exit 
performance equation. We use the Wald test of exogeneity to determine whether syndication 
is exogenous. However, we are not aware of any formal test of whether instruments are weak 
or strong when using the instrumental probit model. Therefore, we calculate the Stock-Yogo 
statistics using the linear IV regression. We further compute an F-test as an alternative test of 
whether the control variables in the first-stage equation (including our main variable of 
interest) are jointly significant.  
Table 8, which reports the endogeneity results, shows that foreign syndication experience 
continues to have a positive impact on performance, even when we control for possible 
endogeneity. The Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis that syndication is exogenous, 
and the F-test shows that the control variables, including our instrument, have a significant 
impact on syndication. This evidence is consistent using the Stock-Yogo statistics for strong 
instruments. Thus, investment concentration index is a strong instrument, consistent with Tian 
(2012). We conclude that the results reported previously are not biased by the endogeneity of 
syndication. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
Accumulated international syndication experience  
It is also possible that international syndication experience as measured by broad, Asian, and 
Western experience is endogenously determined, although these investments often occur long 
before the ultimate exit. However, endogeneity may arise in terms of investment choices. We, 
therefore, use the age of the domestic VC firm as an instrument for the broad, Asian, and 
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Western experience variables. The finding that the age of the domestic VC firm is a good 
instrument for experience is consistent with prior studies on VC, which show that VC firms 
accumulate experience over time (see Dai, Jo, & Kassicieh, 2012, among others). We again 
address the endogeneity concerns in two steps. Once again, we use the Wald test and F-test, 
and provide the Stock-Yogo statistics. 
 Table 9 reports the results on investment behavior, controlling for the endogeneity of 
international syndication experience. The results remain consistent with those reported in 
Table 6. Furthermore, we find no evidence that such syndication experience with foreign VC 
firms is endogenously determined. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
Propensity score matching 
To further ensure that endogeneity is not driving our results, we use a Propensity Score 
Matching technique (Reeb, Sakakibara, & Mahmood, 2012) In our context, it allows to 
improve the comparability of the sample of domestic VC firms with international syndication 
experience to a sample of similar domestic VC firms without similar experience and so 
potentially obtain a more reliable comparison for our performance analysis. To conduct 
propensity score matching, we first select investments made by domestic VC firms who never 
syndicated with foreign VC firms in their subsequent investments. Next, we match each 
foreign and domestic syndicated investment with an equivalent domestic syndicated 
investment based on a propensity score estimated using VC firm age, VC portfolio size, 
financing stage, dummies for the presence of independent and corporate VC firms, and total 
amount received. Using caliper radius matching, we classify a foreign or a domestic VC 
investment as a match for a domestic syndicated investment only when the propensity scores 
for the two investments differ by no more than 5% (following, e.g., Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). 
Using the sample of matched observations, we estimate a logit model. Results are shown in 
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Table 10. We find that the experience coefficients (broad, Asian and Western) are lower than 
in our earlier analyses; however, they are still statistically and economically significant. 
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
Additional robustness checks 
In this section, we report the additional robustness checks of our results. We address a sample 
selection bias that could arise from excluding portfolio companies financed only by foreign 
VC firms (i.e., where no domestic VC firm is participating). We use the two-stage Heckman 
selection model to address this concern. In the first stage, we use the probit model in the 
selection equation to estimate the likelihood of an investment having only foreign investors. 
The “control” group comes from the AVCJ database, which contains 3,950 investments made 
only by foreign VC firms during the 1996–2009 period. In the selection model, we also 
include control variables used in the main regression and control for industry, country, and 
year fixed effects. The results are consistent with our previous findings. The inverse Mills 
ratio is also not significant at any conventional level, suggesting there is no selection bias.  
 Next, we incorporate the conclusions of Chircop, Johan, and Tarsalewska (2017), who 
find, in the context of mergers and acquisitions (which include trade sales), that the use of 
common auditors by the bidders positively affects performance. We therefore adopt their 
methodology and include a dummy variable in our performance analysis that controls for the 
presence of common auditors. Consistent with Chircop et al. (2017), we find that common 
auditors have a positive impact on exit performance, but this impact is only significant at the 
10% level. However, this dummy variable does not affect our conclusions on the impact of 
foreign syndicate experience. Further, we consider the possibility that VC firms’ use of 
different VC funds to invest in portfolio companies affect performance. This situation 
happens in approximately 3% of our deals. We find a positive impact on performance, but the 
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evidence is statistically weak.6  
CONCLUSIONS 
Previous studies document that syndication with domestic VC partners is an effective way for 
foreign VC firms to alleviate the information asymmetry arising from cultural, legal, and 
geographic distance. This study extends the previous literature on VC finance and 
organizational learning by examining the benefits of syndication from the perspective of 
domestic VC firms. We show that domestic VC firms are more likely to invest in early-stage 
ventures and high-tech industries after gaining syndication experience with foreign VC 
partners, specifically those from North America and Europe. The results also show that 
international syndication experience improves the domestic VC firms’ investment 
performance. We, therefore, conclude that domestic VC firms learn from their foreign 
partners, and the knowledge and skills acquired during the international syndication not only 
give them the confidence to invest more in riskier ventures but also improve their subsequent 
investment decisions. 
This study provides at least two practical implications for market practitioners and policy 
makers. First, as part of their growth strategy, domestic VC firms should seek foreign partners 
to invest in syndicated deals with them. This is especially crucial at the very beginning, when 
learning from peers is most valuable. This can accelerate their own growth and thus ensure 
that they will be successful. Second, the learning effect for domestic VC firms is more 
pronounced when their partner firms are from North America and Europe rather than other 
parts of the world. This additional result may stem from either the greater difference in how 
to deal with VC investments or from the increased experience of VC firms located there. 
Domestic VC firms may contribute to the organizational learning by adopting an open view 
                                                             
6 Another factor that could affect exit outcomes in Asia is state ownership (Wang, Jiao, Xu, & Yang, 2018). In 
some Asian countries, state ownership offers useful political connections that may facilitate the IPO process. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to obtain this information for our sample, except for some of the Chinese 
ventures. We, therefore, could not test this alternative factor.  
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on inviting foreign VC firms in targeted deals, as they will benefit from these syndications. 
This may further foster access to other deals identified by foreign VC firms in other markets. 
Our data show that this organizational learning has taken place in many Asian VC firms 
already, suggesting they have understood the potential resulting from international 
syndication.  
Policymakers should promote syndication between domestic and foreign VC firms. This 
requires that policymakers in many of the Asian countries considered facilitate access of 
foreign VC firms to the domestic market. The literature offers several insights on how foreign 
VC investments in domestic markets can be facilitated, including reducing legal barriers and 
adopting international practices (Aizenman & Kendall, 2012; Cumming et al., 2016; Dai et 
al., 2016; Dai & Nahata, 2016; Wang & Wang, 2012). Eventually, this will help Asian VC 
markets to professionalize further and innovative startups located in Asia to receive more 
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Table 1 Definition of variables 
 
Variable name Definition of variable 
Broad experience (I) A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investing domestic VC firm has previously participated in at 
least one syndicated deal that involved a foreign VC firm, and 0 otherwise. In the case of multiple 
domestic VC firms within a syndicate, the variable equals 1 if at least one of them has such syndicate 
experience. 
Asian experience (I) A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investing domestic VC firm has previously participated in at 
least one syndicated deal that involved a foreign VC firm from another Asian country, and 0 otherwise. In 
the case of multiple domestic VC firms within a syndicate, the variable equals 1 if at least one of them has 
such syndicate experience. 
Western experience (I) A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investing domestic VC firm has previously participated in at 
least one syndicated deal that involved a Western (either North American or European) VC firm, and 0 
otherwise. In the case of multiple domestic VC firms within a syndicate, the variable equals 1 if at least 
one of them has such syndicate experience. 
Broad experience The logarithm of the cumulative number of investments a domestic VC firm has previously participated in 
that involved a foreign VC firm. In the case of multiple domestic VC firms within a syndicate, the variable 
takes the logarithm of the cumulative number of previous investments of all domestic VC firms. 
Asian experience The logarithm of the cumulative number of investments a domestic VC firm has previously participated in 
that involved a foreign VC firm from another Asian country. In the case of multiple domestic VC firms 
within a syndicate, the variable takes the logarithm of the cumulative number of previous investments of 
all domestic VC firms. 
Western experience The logarithm of the cumulative number of investments a domestic VC firm has previously participated in 
that involved a Western (either North American or European) VC firm. In the case of multiple domestic 
VC firms within a syndicate, the variable takes the logarithm of the cumulative number of previous 
investments of all domestic VC firms. 
Successful exit A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investee company has been exited via an IPO or a trade sale 
by the end of 2012, and 0 otherwise. 
Early-stage venture A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the portfolio company is in the early stage of development 
when it receives its initial VC funding, and 0 otherwise. This variable represents our Risk measure I in our 
analysis. 
Expansion-stage venture A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the portfolio company is in the expansion stage of development 
when it receives its initial VC funding, and 0 otherwise. 
Small early-stage fund A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the domestic VC firm's portfolio size is in the bottom 25th 
percentile and the current financing round of the portfolio company is in the early stage of development, 
and 0 otherwise.  
First-round investment A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if it is the first round of VC investment for the portfolio company, 
and 0 otherwise. This variable represents our Risk measure II in our analysis. 
High-tech A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the portfolio company is in a high-tech industry (i.e., 
computer-related, IT, medical/healthcare, or telecommunications). This classification is consistent with 
that of Dai et al. (2012). This variable represents our Risk measure III in our analysis. 
VC syndication A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the round involves more than one VC firm (i.e., domestic or 
foreign), and 0 otherwise. 
VC portfolio size The logarithm of the number of portfolio companies in the VC firm's portfolio at the time of investment. 
For syndicated deals, we use the average portfolio size of all the domestic and foreign VC firms involved.  
Independent VC A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there is at least one independent VC firm (whether domestic or 
foreign) that is investing in the portfolio company, and 0 otherwise. 
Corporate VC A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is at least one corporate VC firm (whether domestic or 
foreign) that is investing in the portfolio company, and 0 otherwise. 
Total rounds received The total number of rounds the portfolio company has received before exit. 
Stock market development The total market capitalization of the stock market in a particular year (scaled by gross domestic product) 




















Cultural distance A measure of cultural distance between the portfolio company and the VC firms based on the four 
Hofstede measures of culture (i.e., power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty 
avoidance), as used in Dai and Nahata (2016) and Kogut and Singh (1988). The data come from Geert 
Hofstede’s website (www.geerthofstede.nl). The following Cartesian distance measure is used to 
calculate cultural distance:  
, 
where Ccompany i is the domestic portfolio company's culture based on measure i and CVC firm i is the culture 
measure of the domestic/foreign VC firm based on the same measure i. 
Legality A measure of the quality of the legal system in the country of the portfolio company (following 
Berkowitz et al., 2003). 
Investment concentration  
index 
This index measures by how much a VC firm’s portfolio deviates in industry composition from a market 
portfolio consisting of all portfolio companies in which a VC firm could have invested. More details on 
the exact calculation is provided in the Analysis Section. 




This table presents the basic statistics on the investments (at the round level) made by foreign and domestic VC firms in the following Asian countries: China (PRC), 
Japan, India, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Other (Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Pakistan). Panel A describes 
the number of investments, total capital invested, mean investment size, and mean syndicate size in each country. Panel B describes the overall VC syndication in 
the Asian countries. Panel C describes only the syndication between domestic and foreign VC firms. 
 
Table 2 VC investments in Asia, 1990–2013 
 
Panel A: Number of investments, capital invested, and syndicate size 
  No. of investments 
  
Total capital received   
Mean 




  N %   $M %   $M (#)   
China (PRC) 4,419 37.6   920.34 34.4   1.12 3.95   
Japan 2,924 24.9   629.06 23.5   0.50 4.92   
India 1,990 16.9   486.97 18.2   1.10 3.70    
South Korea 948 8.1   247.96 9.3   0.77 3.48   
Singapore 373 3.2   75.10 2.8   0.96 4.16   
Hong Kong 277 2.4   52.63 2.0   0.97 4.46   
Taiwan 214 1.8   69.52 2.6   1.09 5.03   
Other 639 5.4   193.19 7.2   0.75 3.54   
Total/Average 11,748 100.0   334.34 100.0   0.91 4.16   
Panel B: Syndicated investments 
  No. of syndicated investments   
No. of syndicated investments with 
foreign VC firms 
  
No. of syndicated 
investments without foreign 
VC firms 
  
  N %   N %   N %   
China (PRC) 1,491 42.1   563 46.6   928 39.7   
Japan 846 23.9   103 8.5   743 31.8   
India 535 15.1   271 22.5   264 11.3   
South Korea 270 7.6   64 5.3   206 8.8   
Singapore 154 4.3   94 7.8   60 2.6   
Hong Kong 95 2.7   48 4.0   47 2.0   
Taiwan 59 1.7   30 2.5   29 1.2   
Other 94 2.7   34 2.8   60 2.6   
Total 3,544 30.2   1,207 34.1   2,337 65.9   
Panel C: Syndicated investments between domestic and foreign VC firms 
  
No. of syndicated investments with 
foreign VC firms 
  
No. of syndicated investments with 
Asian VC firms 
  
No. of syndicated 
investments with Western 
VC firms 
  
  N %   N %   N %   
China (PRC) 563 46.6   131 48.5   432 46.1   
Japan 103 8.5   28 10.4   75 8.0   
India 271 22.5   27 10.0   244 26.0   
South Korea 64 5.3   27 10.0   37 3.9   
Singapore 94 7.8   28 10.4   66 7.0   
Hong Kong 48 4.0   13 4.8   35 3.7   
Taiwan 30 2.5   11 4.1   19 2.0   
Other 34 2.8   8 3.0   26 2.8   





This table presents the statistics on the domestic VC firms' investment activities before and after foreign syndication. We define the year of their first foreign syndication as year 0 and calculate the proportion of investments in the early stage, those in the first 
round, those with successful exits, and high-tech investments in different years. The results are reported over the windows (–1,+1), (–3,+3), and (–5,+5), respectively. We calculate the changes as the difference between the averages before and after 
foreign-syndication periods. Panel A shows the changes in the early-stage investments (early-stage venture), Panel B shows those in the first-round investments (first-round investment), Panel C shows those in high-tech investments (high-tech), and Panel D 









Table 3 Domestic VC firms' investment activities before and after foreign syndication 
 
  Broad experience   Asian experience   Western experience 
  Before After Difference P-value 
 
Before After Difference P-value 
 
Before After Difference P-value 
Panel A: Change in early-stage investments 
Change over (–1, +1) 0.089 0.118 0.030 0.027 0.113 0.102 -0.011 0.574 0.100 0.147 0.047 0.005 
Change over (–3, +3) 0.116 0.149 0.033 0.024 0.158 0.127 -0.032 0.133 0.125 0.181 0.057 0.001 
Change over (–5, +5) 0.125 0.159 0.035 0.020 0.164 0.130 -0.034 0.105 0.137 0.190 0.054 0.003 
Panel B: Change in first-round investments 
Change over (–1, +1) 0.134 0.160 0.027 0.031 0.156 0.148 -0.008 0.341 0.160 0.219 0.059 0.001 
Change over (–3, +3) 0.179 0.222 0.043 0.017 0.216 0.193 -0.023 0.061* 0.183 0.299 0.116 0.000 
Change over (–5, +5) 0.170 0.250 0.080 0.001 0.225 0.215 -0.010 0.229 0.200 0.323 0.123 0.000 
Panel C: Change in high-tech investments 
Change over (–1, +1) 0.104 0.183 0.079 0.000 0.145 0.138 -0.008 0.718 0.124 0.221 0.097 0.000 
Change over (–3, +3) 0.136 0.242 0.107 0.000 0.169 0.185 0.017 0.499 0.158 0.285 0.127 0.000 
Change over (–5, +5) 0.144 0.258 0.114 0.000 0.178 0.208 0.031 0.211 0.168 0.296 0.128 0.000 
Panel D: Change in successful exits 
Change over (–1, +1) 0.011 0.018 0.008 0.273 0.037 0.021 0.016 0.137 0.007 0.016 0.010 0.143 
Change over (–3, +3) 0.012 0.058 0.046 0.000 0.020 0.069 0.050 0.001 0.017 0.059 0.043 0.001 





Table 4 Investment selection and foreign syndicate experience 

































This table presents the multivariate analyses of domestic VC firms' investment choices. We use logit regressions in all the models. The dependent variable in Models 1–3 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
investment is in the early stage, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Models 4–6 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for first-round investments, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Models 7–9 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture is in a high-tech industry, and 0 otherwise. All the variables are defined in Table 1. We report marginal effects in all models, rather than raw coefficients. All regressions 
include year and country fixed effects. The standard errors in our regressions are clustered by the industry of the portfolio company. P-values are reported in parentheses below the marginal effects.   
 
Risk measure I:  
Early-stage Venture 
 
Risk measure II:  
First-round Investment 
 
 Risk measure III:  
High-tech  
 
 Dependent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Foreign syndicate experience       
 
      
     








Asian experience (I) 0.1270  0.0897 
   
0.0276 
 
(0.000)   (0.000)  
   
(0.068) 
 
Western experience (I) 0.2302  0.1893 
    
0.1432 
(0.000)   (0.000)  
    
(0.007) 
Control variables  
     
VC syndication 0.1151 0.1110 0.1110  0.0455 0.0439 0.0438 
  
0.0239 0.023 0.023 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  
  
(0.034) (0.046) (0.045) 
VC portfolio size -0.0552 -0.0603 -0.0609  -0.0233 -0.0251 -0.0250 
  
-0.0086 -0.0109 -0.0107 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
  
(0.025) (0.028) (0.030) 
Independent VC 0.0150 0.0135 0.0139  0.0003 0.00173 0.00143 
  
0.0051 0.0043 0.0045 
(0.471)  (0.517)  (0.504)   (0.985)  (0.900)  (0.917)  
  
(0.730) (0.764) (0.755) 
Corporate VC 0.0782 0.0780 0.0786  0.0854 0.0855 0.0861 
  
0.0030 0.0032 0.0034 
(0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
  
(0.865) (0.856) (0.847) 
Total rounds received 0.3311 0.3280 0.3272  0.0470 0.0434 0.0437 
  
0.0535 0.0513 0.0515 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.062) (0.085) (0.082) 
  
(0.042) (0.044) (0.049) 
Stock market development 0.0094 0.0099 0.0100  0.0081 0.0078 0.0077 
  
0.0017 0.0012 0.0012 
(0.442) (0.413) (0.410)  (0.377) (0.399) (0.404) 
  
(0.339) (0.282) (0.482) 
No. of observations 3,309 3,309 3,309 
 
3,309 3,309 3,309 
  
3,309 3,309 3,309 
Pseudo-R2 0.221 0.224 0.217 
 
0.232 0.228 0.226 
  








Table 5 Investment performance and foreign syndicate experience 
















































This table presents an analysis of domestic VC firms' investment performance. We use logit regressions to investigate whether past foreign 
syndicate experience influences current domestic VC firms' investment performance in terms of the likelihood of a successful exit. The dependent 
variable in all models is the dummy variable successful exit. In Models 1–3, we use dummy variables of our experience measures as proxies. In 
Models 4–6, we use alternative, continuous proxies of experience. All the variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions include year and country 
fixed effects. P-values are reported in parentheses below the marginal effects.  
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Foreign syndicate experience             
Broad experience (I) 0.1041 - - - - - 
(0.004) - - - - - 
Asian experience (I) - 0.1175 - - - - 
- (0.002) - - - - 
Western experience (I) - - 0.1040 - - - 
- - (0.007) - - - 
Broad experience - - - 0.0558 - - 
- - - (0.052) - - 
Asian experience - - - - 0.0565 - 
- - - - (0.084) - 
Western experience - - - - - 0.0506 
- - - - - (0.088) 
Control variables             
Early-stage venture -0.1592 -0.1521 -0.1550 -0.1561 -0.1540 -0.1512 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Expansion-stage venture -0.1994 -0.1962 -0.2031 -0.2038 -0.1992 -0.2030 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VC syndication 0.1346 0.1391 0.1382 0.1344 0.1422 0.1382 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VC portfolio size -0.0239 -0.0222 -0.0220 -0.0210 -0.0203 -0.0204 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Independent VC -0.0078 -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0081 -0.0006 -0.0064 
(0.907) (1.011) (0.877) (0.946) (1.020) (0.892) 
Corporate VC 0.1128 0.1058 0.1020 0.1025 0.1110 0.1005 
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Total rounds received 0.2618 0.2579 0.2617 0.2704 0.2687 0.2715 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock market development 0.0063 0.0053 0.0063 0.0063 0.0064 0.0063 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) 
No. of observations 3309 3309 3309 3309 3309 3309 





Table 6 Investment selection and foreign syndicate experience: Legality and cultural distance 


































This table presents the multivariate analyses of domestic VC firms' investment choices, extending the analysis in Table 5 by including controls for the quality of the legal environment (legality) and the cultural 
distance between the venture and the VC firms (cultural distance). We use logit regressions in all models. The dependent variable in Models 1–3 is the dummy variable early-stage venture. The dependent variable 
in Models 4–6 is the dummy variable first-round investment. The dependent variable in Models 7–9 is the dummy variable that high-tech. All the variables are defined in Table 1. We report marginal effects in all 
models, rather than raw coefficients. All regressions include year and country fixed effects. P-values are reported in parentheses below the marginal effects.  
 
Risk measure I: Early-stage venture  Risk measure II: First-round investment  Risk measure III: High-tech  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Foreign syndicate experience                  
Broad experience (I) 0.0870  0.0712  0.0442   
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.006)   
Asian experience (I) 0.127  0.0897   0.0276  
(0.000)   (0.000)    (0.068)  
Western experience (I) 0.232  0.1893    0.1432 
(0.000)   (0.000)     (0.007) 
Control variables      
Legality 0.0097 0.0082 0.0080  0.0419 0.0423 0.0423  0.0263 0.0256 0.0256 
(0.652) (0.703) (0.709)  (0.095) (0.090) (0.089)  (0.127) (0.135) (0.135) 
Cultural distance -0.0098 -0.0093 -0.0092  -0.0112 -0.0113 -0.0111  -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0029 
(0.669) (0.686) (0.687)  (0.485) (0.482) (0.489)  (0.874) (0.875) (0.872) 
VC syndication 0.0342 0.02013 0.0211  0.0316 0.0202 0.0233  0.0239 0.0230 0.0230 
(0.085) (0.144) (0.122)  (0.071) (0.128) (0.140)  (0.074) (0.146) (0.145) 
VC portfolio size -0.0552 -0.0603 -0.0609  -0.0233 -0.0251 -0.0250  -0.0086 -0.0109 -0.0107 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.025) (0.028) (0.030) 
Independent VC 0.0150 0.0135 0.0139  -0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0014  0.005 0.00433 0.00449 
(0.471)  (0.517)  (0.504)   (0.985) (0.900) (0.917)  (0.730) (0.764) (0.755) 
Corporate VC 0.0782 0.0780 0.0786  0.0854 0.0855 0.0861  0.00306 0.00325 0.00346 
(0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.865) (0.856) (0.847) 
Total rounds received 0.3310 0.3280 0.3270  0.0470 0.0434 0.0437  0.0535 0.0513 0.0515 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.062) (0.085) (0.082)  (0.042) (0.050) (0.049) 
Stock market development 0.0093 0.0098 0.0101  0.0082 0.0078 0.0076  0.017 0.0123 0.0124 
(0.441)  (0.414)  (0.411)   (0.378) (0.397) (0.405)  (0.839) (0.882) (0.882) 
No. of observations 3,309 3,309 3,309  3,309 3,309 3,309  3,309 3,309 3,309  







Table 7 Investment performance and foreign syndicate experience: Legality and cultural distance 
 
Ln[p/(1-p)] = β0 + β1(Broad-experience;Asian-experience;Western-experience) + βControl-variables + Year & 








































This table presents an analysis of domestic VC firms' investment performance, extending the analysis in Table 4 by including controls for the 
quality of the legal environment (legality) and the cultural distance between the venture and the VC firms (cultural distance). We use logit 
regressions to investigate whether past foreign syndicate experience influences current domestic VC firms' investment performance in terms of the 
likelihood of a successful exit. The dependent variable in all models is the dummy variable successful exit. All the variables are defined in Table 1. 






Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Foreign syndicate experience 
Broad experience (I) 0.0974 - - 0.0843 - - 
(0.035) - - (0.018) - - 
Asian experience (I) - 0.0993 - - 0.0867 - 
- (0.042) - - (0.019) - 
Western experience (I) - - 0.1017 - - 0.0893 
- - (0.047) - - (0.016) 
Control variables 
Early-stage venture -0.1961 -0.1970 -0.1970 - - - 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - - - 
Expansion-stage venture -0.1501 -0.1510 -0.1510 - - - 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - - - 
Small early-stage fund - - - -0.0883 -0.0885 -0.0887 
- - - (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Legality 0.0816 0.0816 0.0815 0.0867 0.0866 0.0865 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cultural distance 0.0168 0.0167 0.0168 0.0248 0.0247 0.0248 
(0.468) (0.471) (0.469) (0.285) (0.287) (0.285) 
VC syndication 0.1371 0.1382 0.1383 0.1451 0.1461 0.1463 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VC portfolio size -0.0214 -0.0201 -0.0200 -0.0154 -0.0144 -0.0143 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) 
Independent VC -0.0084 -0.0085 -0.0083 -0.0083 -0.0084 -0.0084 
(0.622) (0.620) (0.620) (0.636) (0.631) (0.631) 
Corporate VC 0.0945 0.0833  0.0926 0.0877 0.0884 0.0976 
(0.026) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.044) (0.027) 
Total rounds received 0.2651 0.2661 0.2661 0.2431 0.2442 0.2441 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock market development 0.0032 0.0025 0.0033 0.0031 0.0032 0.0027 
(0.012) (0.022) (0.032) (0.037) (0.018) (0.028) 
No. of observations 3,309 3,309 3,309 3,309 3,309 3,309 





Table 8 Investment performance – Endogeneity 
Stage I: Ln(Number of VC firms syndicated) = β0 + β1Investment-concentration-index  
+ βControl-variables + Year & Country + є 
Stage II: Ln[p/(1-p)] = β0 + β1(Broad-experience;Asian-experience;Western-experience) 



































This table presents an analysis of domestic VC firms' investment performance, controlling for the 
endogenous decision to syndicate. See the “Endogeneity” section for details on the methodology. We use 
instrumental probit regressions to investigate whether VC syndicate experience (i.e., the variable VC 
syndication) influences domestic VC firms' investment performance in terms of the likelihood of a 
successful exit. The dependent variable in all models is the dummy variable successful exit. The Wald test 
of exogeneity tests whether past syndication is exogenous, while the F-test is a joint test of weak or strong 
instruments. The values of the Stock-Yogo statistics are obtained using IVREG in STATA. All the 
variables are defined in Table 1. We report marginal effects instead of coefficients. All regressions include 
year and country fixed effects. P-values are reported in parentheses below the marginal effects. 
 
First stage regressions  Second stage regressions 
 Variables   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Foreign syndicate experience         
Broad experience (I) 
  
0.0977 - - 
Asian experience (I) 
  
- 0.0904 - 
Western experience (I) 
  
- - 0.1062 
Investment concentration index 0.6141 
 
VC syndication (Instrumented)  
 
0.1602 0.1296 0.1462 
Control variables 
  
Small early-stage fund -0.0840 
 
-0.1423 -0.1475 -0.1422 
Legality 0.0267 
 
0.0504 0.0513 0.0502 
Cultural distance 0.0132 
 
0.0197 0.0191 -0.0192 
VC portfolio size -0.0372 
 
-0.0563 -0.0291 -0.0375 
Independent VC 0.0114 
 
0.0184 0.0189 0.0187 
Corporate VC 0.0836 
 
0.1212 0.1289 0.1243 
Total rounds received 0.1642 
 
0.3158 0.3141 0.3058 
Stock market development 0.0047 
 
0.0069 0.0057 0.0056 
  
No. of observations 3309 
 
3309 3309 3309 
Adjusted R2 /Pseudo-R2 0.1841 
 
0.2120 0.2120 0.2121 
Wald test of exogeneity (χ2) 
  
2.08 1.65 1.32 
Wald test of exogeneity (p-value) 
  
(0.121) (0.194) (0.224) 
Stock-Yogo statistics critical value 10% 
  
12.57 10.59 13.25 
F-test  57.44 
 
57.44 48.89 55.23 
F-test (p-value) (0.000) 
 








Table 9 Investment selection – Endogeneity 
Stage I: Ln[Cumulative number of (Broad experience; Asian experience; Western-experience)] = β0 + β1VC-experience 
+ βControl-variables + Year & Country + є 
Stage II: Ln[p/(1-p)] = β0 + β1(Broad (Instrumented);Asian (Instrumented);Western-experience (Instrumented))+βControl-variables +Year & Country + є 
This table presents an analysis of domestic VC firms' investment selection, controlling for the endogenous decision to syndicate. We use an instrumental probit model to address endogeneity. The dependent variables are as defined in Table 4. The 
variables broad experience, Asian experience, and Western experience are the instrumented variables. The Wald test of exogeneity tests whether syndication is exogenous, while the F-test is a joint test of weak or strong instruments. The values of the 
Stock-Yogo statistics are obtained using IVREG in STATA. All the variables are defined in Table 1. We report marginal effects instead of coefficients. All regressions include year and country fixed effects. P-values are reported in parentheses below 
the marginal effects. 
 
   
Risk measure I: 
Early-stage venture 
 
Risk measure II:  
First-round investment 
 
Risk measure III:  
High-tech 









(Western) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Investment selection                     
Broad experience (Instrumented)    0.1088  0.0854  0.0588   
Asian experience (Instrumented)    0.1676  0.1112   0.0356  
Western experience (Instrumented)    0.2877  0.2309    0.1876 
VC Experience (Age) 0.3051 0.4117 0.4221      
Control variables         
Legality 0.0068 0.0066 0.0050 0.0113 0.0098 0.0091  0.0499 0.0508 0.0470  0.0313 0.0307 0.0300 
Cultural distance -0.0072 -0.0061 -0.0072 -0.0116 -0.0105 -0.0104  -0.0131 -0.0124 -0.0132  -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.0035 
VC syndication 0.0252 0.0164 0.0124 0.0393 0.0234 0.0238  0.0379 0.0226 0.0280  0.0275 0.0258 0.0260 
VC portfolio size -0.0413 -0.0421 -0.0348 -0.0646 -0.0669 -0.0670  -0.0270 -0.0284 -0.0295  -0.0095 -0.0125 -0.0127 
Independent VC 0.0101 0.0107 0.0102 0.0174 0.0162 0.0167   -0.0004 -0.0020 -0.0016   0.0060 0.0051 0.0050 
Corporate VC 0.0544 0.0445 0.0484 0.0938 0.0889 0.0880   0.0999 0.1017 0.0973   0.0034 0.0038 0.0041 
Total rounds received 0.2246 0.2380 0.2200 0.3873 0.3838 0.3859   0.0517 0.0490 0.0516   0.0599 0.0600 0.0567 
Stock market 0.0062 0.0076 0.0063 0.0110 0.0114 0.0115   0.0098 0.0087 0.0085   0.0189 0.0139 0.0136 
        
No. of observations 3309 3309 3309 3309 3309 3309  3309 3309 3309  3309 3309 3309 
Adjusted R2 /Pseudo-R2 0.188 0.1921 0.1914 0.201 0.202 0.212  0.214 0.231 0.226  0.229 0.222 0.234 
Stock-Yogo statistics critical value 10%    18.45 22.76 22.43  23.51 21.15 19.04  19.66 18.62 20.17 
Wald test of exogeneity    1.98 1.91 2.54  2.01 1.92 2.01  1.95 1.87 2.07 









Table 10 Investment performance and propensity score matching 





































This table presents an analysis of domestic VC firms' investment performance. We investigate whether past foreign syndicate experience influences current local 
VCs' investment performance in terms of the likelihood of successful exits. The dependent variable in all models is the dummy variable successful exit. We select 
investments with no foreign VCs in the subsequent investments. We match these investments with investments made by domestic VC firms with no foreign VCs 
syndications using propensity score matching. All the variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions include year and country fixed effects. P-values are 
reported in parentheses below the marginal effects.  
 
 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Foreign syndicate experience    
Broad experience (I) 0.0625   
(0.042)   
Asian experience (I)  0.0613  
 (0.032)  
Western experience (I)   0.0601 
  (0.038) 
Control variables    
Early-stage venture -0.1356 -0.1350 -0.1359 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Expansion-stage venture -0.1810 -0.1811 -0.1812 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VC syndication 0.1143 0.1145 0.1141 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
VC portfolio size -0.0189 -0.0166 -0.0158 
(0.027) (0.033) (0.037) 
Independent VC -0.0081 -0.0084 -0.0088 
(0.741) (0.716) (0.714) 
Corporate VC 0.0627 0.0621 0.0601 
(0.037) (0.039) (0.021) 
Total rounds received 0.2441 0.2446 0.2440 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock market development 0.0164 0.0167 0.0162 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of observations 689 689 689 































This table shows the comparison between our database (AVCJ) and other databases used in previous studies: the VentureXpert database, China Venture database and Zero2IPO database 




Appendix Table A1 Data representativeness 
 
 
    China India Japan  Hong Kong South Korea Singapore Taiwan Other Total Time coverage 
Observations per year 
(average) 
AVCJ N 4,419 1,990 2,924 277 948 373 214 603 11,748 20 years 587 
VentureXpert N 581 928 0 202 2,104 266 173 0 4,254 10 years 425 
China Venture N 4,637 0 0 116 0 0 0 0 4,753 23 years 207 








Appendix Table 2A Correlation matrix 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) Broad experience (I) 1.00                           
(2) Asian experience (I) 0.63 1.00                         
(3) Western experience (I) 0.90 0.46 1.00                       
(4) Broad experience 0.83 0.72 0.83 1.00                     
(5) Asian experience 0.54 0.86 0.43 0.76 1.00                   
(6) Western experience 0.77 0.55 0.86 0.96 0.59 1.00                 
(7) VC syndication 0.23 0.27 0.22 0.13 0.08 0.12 1.00               
(8) VC portfolio size 0.43 0.33 0.41 0.47 0.33 0.44 -0.03 1.00             
(9) Independent VC 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.24 1.00           
(10) Corporate VC 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.22 -0.04 -0.40 1.00         
(11) Early-stage venture 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.13 -0.14 -0.04 0.07 1.00       
(12) Expansion-stage venture -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.15 0.17 0.05 -0.08 -0.91 1.00     
(13) Total rounds received -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.14 -0.09 0.00 0.05 0.21 -0.18 1.00   
(14) Stock market development -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.22 -0.10 0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 1.00 






















No. of ventures 
(2) 
No. of ventures backed by VC 
firms with broad experience 
(3) 
No. of ventures backed by VC firms 
without broad experience 
  
(4) 
No. of ventures backed 
by VC firms with Asian 
experience 
(5) 
No. of ventures backed by VC 
firms with Western experience 
(6) 
No. of ventures backed by VC 
firms with both Asian and 
Western experience 
  N N % N %   N % N % N % 
1996 16 3 18.8 13 81.3   0 0.0 3 18.8 0 0.0 
1997 51 0 0.0 51 100.0   0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
1998 63 0 0.0 63 100.0   0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
1999 56 4 7.1 52 92.9   4 7.1 0 0.0 2 0.5 
2000 234 50 21.4 184 78.6   10 4.3 40 17.1 9 2.1 
2001 159 54 34.0 105 66.0   17 10.7 37 23.3 9 2.1 
2002 118 28 23.7 90 76.3   13 11.0 15 12.7 10 2.4 
2003 106 41 38.7 65 61.3   26 24.5 15 14.2 20 4.7 
2004 186 55 29.6 131 70.4   32 17.2 23 12.4 29 6.8 
2005 232 78 33.6 154 66.4   42 18.1 36 15.5 37 8.7 
2006 421 150 35.6 271 64.4   64 15.2 86 20.4 56 13.2 
2007 630 250 39.7 380 60.3   135 21.4 115 18.3 79 18.6 
2008 578 255 44.1 323 55.9   135 23.4 120 20.8 98 23.1 
2009 459 183 39.9 276 60.1   101 22.0 82 17.9 75 17.7 
Total 3,309 1,151 34.8 2,158 65.2   579 17.5 572 17.3 424 12.8 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the investments (company level, not round level) made by domestic VC firms from 1996 to 2009. Column (1) shows the number of ventures invested in by all domestic VC firms. Columns (2) 
and (3) show a breakdown of these investments, as follows: (2) describes the ventures invested in by domestic VC firms with foreign syndicate experience (broad experience), and (3) describes the ventures invested in by domestic VC firms 
without foreign syndicate experience (our control group). Columns (4) to (6) describe the ventures invested in by domestic VC firms with foreign syndicate experience, i.e., a breakdown of column (2). Column (4) describes the ventures 
invested in by domestic VC firms with Asian experience; (5) describes the ventures invested in by domestic VC firms with Western experience; and (6) describes the ventures invested in by domestic VC firms with both Asian and Western 








Appendix Table 4A Investment performance and foreign syndicate experience, by exit route 









































This table presents an analysis of domestic VC firms' investment performance, distinguishing between IPOs and trade sales. We use logit regressions 
to investigate whether past foreign syndicate experience influences current domestic VC firms' investment performance in terms of the likelihood of a 
successful exit. The dependent variable in Models 1–3 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investee company has been exited via an IPO, 
while in Models 4–6 it is a dummy equaling 1 if the exit was via a trade sale, by the end of 2012. In Models 1–3 (Models 4–6), we exclude the 
observations with a trade sale exit (an IPO exit). All the variables are defined in Table 1 of the manuscript. All regressions include year and country 




IPO exit  Trade sale exit 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Foreign syndicate experience 
   
 
   
Broad experience (I) 0.0730 - -  0.0780 - - 
 
(0.093) - -  (0.054) - - 
Asian experience (I) - 0.0761 -  - 0.0771 - 
 
- (0.084) -  - (0.072) - 
Western experience (I) - - 0.1122  - - 0.0791 
 
- - (0.042)  - - (0.063) 
Control variables 
   
 
   
Small early-stage fund -0.0846 -0.0847 -0.0848  -0.0097 -0.0097 -0.0096 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.262) (0.265) (0.266) 
Legality 0.0718 0.0718 0.0717  0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.682) (0.685) (0.686) 
Cultural distance 0.0209 0.0209 0.0209  -0.00827 -0.00834 -0.00833 
 
(0.343) (0.344) (0.343)  (0.365) (0.362) (0.362) 
VC syndication 0.1141 0.1141 0.1104  0.0278 0.0282 0.0283 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.066) (0.071) (0.066) 
VC portfolio size -0.0069 -0.0067 -0.0068  -0.0090 -0.0085 -0.0083 
 
(0.074) (0.063) (0.084)  (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) 
Independent VC -0.0056 -0.0057 -0.0058  -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0021 
 
(0.683) (0.676) (0.673)  (0.791) (0.793) (0.798) 
Corporate VC 0.0840 0.0739 0.0829  0.0036 0.0031 0.0030 
 
(0.080) (0.081) (0.088)  (0.730) (0.766) (0.773) 
Total rounds received 0.1751 0.1750 0.1741  0.0671 0.0674 0.0676 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock market development 0.0162 0.0161 0.0163  0.0092 0.0093 0.0091 
 
(0.031) (0.011) (0.021)  (0.070) (0.071) (0.672) 
No. of observations 3,099 3,099 3,099  2,766 2,766 2,766 
Pseudo-R2 0.2071 0.2072 0.2101  0.2431 0.2511 0.2132 
